Commentary on Cantu & Testa by Kloster, Moira
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 7 
Jun 6th, 9:00 AM - Jun 9th, 5:00 PM 
Commentary on Cantu & Testa 
Moira Kloster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Kloster, Moira, "Commentary on Cantu & Testa" (2007). OSSA Conference Archive. 18. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA7/papersandcommentaries/18 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Kloster, M.G. (2007). Commentary on Paola Cantù & I. Testa: “Is common ground a word or just a sound? 
Second order consensus and argumentation theory.” In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the 
Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-3). Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Copyright © 2007, the author. 
Commentary on Paola Cantù and Italo Testa: “Is Common Ground 
a Word or Just a Sound? Second Order Consensus and 
Argumentation Theory” 
 
MOIRA GUTTERIDGE KLOSTER 
 
Department of Philosophy and Politics 
University College of the Fraser Valley,  
Abbotsford, B.C. V2S 7M8 
Canada  
Moira.Kloster@ucfv.ca 
 
 
It’s a truism that there’s “nowt so rare as common sense”.  Authors Cantu and Testa 
construct a parallel insight for common ground: it will be rare to find a “there” that can be 
the comfortable space we hope for. Generally, common ground implies a peaceful place, 
where disagreement is mercifully – even if only temporarily – absent.  It contrasts with 
the spaces of disagreement, where points are contested and procedures are challenged.  
Cantu and Testa’s crucial claim is that we will actually be better off if we look in a 
different direction – if we see common ground as a moving target instead of a fixed 
location.  We will be better able to understand how consensus and dissensus can co-exist, 
instead of being two separate arenas for action.  In addition, the authors’ proposed 
concept of common ground includes a specific interpretation of rationality which they 
propose as a valuable source of insight in comparing theories of argumentation. 
The title of the paper, “Is common ground a word or just a sound?” invites us first 
to consider the possibility that there is no “there” which is “common ground” at all.  As 
the authors indicate, the concept of common ground can be used in such different ways 
within theories of argument and argumentation that it’s hard to be confident there is a 
single shared concept. For example, can common ground be seen equally plausibly as the 
starting point for argument, as the end point, or as one of the resting points in between?  
Cantu and Testa attempt a classification of theories according to where the common 
ground is located in each but quickly conclude that such a classification is not going to 
work.  Common ground and the consensus it implies cannot be unequivocally located. 
One consequence might be that there is no such place as “common ground”.  Consensus 
can neither be situated there nor proved to need any such resting place.   
However, Cantu and Testa step back from the troubling prospect of eliminating 
the concept of common ground entirely.  Instead, they salvage the value of the concept  
by making it “second order” – a way of reaching agreement on how rules or procedures 
might reasonably be changed as the “first order” argument progresses. If I follow their 
proposal correctly, “common ground” is metaphorically neither the starting point at the 
bottom of the cliff of argument, nor the viewpoint achieved at the top, nor even any of the 
ledges in between that would have been wide enough to rest on.  Instead, common ground 
is analogous to a good climbing hold – something climbers can grip firmly until they 
have safely moved to their next position, and then let go of, as a new hold becomes the 
fixed point for making the next upward move. 
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The authors argue that the lack of such a second order notion of common ground 
is a deficit in some theories of argument.  If a theory of argument cannot account for how 
arguers move away from common ground, the theory is going to have to presume that 
arguments must be abandoned under certain conditions of dissent.  Such a limitation 
would be serious: in general, we want the maximum number of arguments to be capable 
of being carried to resolution. 
One particularly appealing consequence of adding a “second order” consensus is, 
as they note, that it permits us to identify common ground without being forced into 
imposing the acceptance of any particular points of view or particular practices from start 
to finish of an argument. From an alternate dispute resolution perspective, this is an 
encouraging trend towards remaining more open to ways in which the parties to a dispute 
can design their argument processes for better results.  
Instead of defining rationality in terms of an individual’s assent to certain 
statements, or adherence to specific rules of logic, the authors define rationality as a 
characteristic of the argumentation practice itself.  A process will be rational if it properly 
employs second-order consensus about procedural questions to negotiate successfully the 
shifts between consensus and dissensus within the first-order argument.  Again, from an 
alternative dispute resolution perspective, what seems valuable about this definition is the 
way it permits us to sidestep even the need to agree on a “unique and absolute concept of 
rationality” in advance of working on disagreements.  This permits us not to worry about 
individual competence or individual psychology when entering into a dispute or being 
asked to consider mediating a dispute.  Instead, we are free to “consider conflict and 
difference of opinion as essential and fruitful elements of every argumentation practice”.  
This permits arguments to be much more than an unfortunate detour on the way to 
consensus or a regrettable departure from consensus.  We are free to see the many 
negotiations within or between arguments as a valuable way of working out what 
rationality is, not just as a way of finding where rationality must lead us.   
Another valuable component of this shift in perspective is that we can see 
consensus as something that coexists fruitfully with dissent. Encouraging a second-order 
consideration of what is happening in the argument practice will, in the authors’ 
estimation, allow arguers to express radical dissent without having their communication 
break down.  This means the arguers can recognize the goal of the argument as something 
quite distinct from just the outcome produced by following a single set of rules from 
beginning to end.  This seems to be a very helpful way to shift argumentation away from 
game-playing, both in spirit and in practice.  Moving away from the notion of inviolable 
rules or specified games permits ongoing innovation in argument practices.  This may be 
very helpful as we argue within increasingly diverse communities of belief and 
expectation. 
What remains open is whether this new analysis can still do the job we expected 
of common ground, or whether it is better seen as a new concept – “dynamic consensus”, 
say – which would be a worthy addition to argumentation theory in its own right.  While 
there could be static forms of consensus, in which an agreement, once reached, is 
honoured indefinitely, there could also be forms of consensus which are highly mobile.  
We are generally unwise to picture disagreements as something to be settled once and for 
all.  (Few models of dispute resolution are based on a requirement of consensus, because 
consensus can be so fragile.)    
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Here I find the authors short on examples to illustrate how their model illuminates 
or improves real argument practice. The authors stay entirely within a theoretical 
framework, ending their paper with an application of their concept to meta-theoretical 
analysis. They demonstrate how their second-order principle shows that Pragma-
Dialectics and Walton’s New Dialectics differ in their concept of rationality.  It seems 
entirely appropriate that a rethinking of “common ground” should cause us to rethink 
related concepts such as rationality.  However, if this new interpretation is also to be of 
value within argumentation practice, we will need to see how it applies directly to first-
order arguments.  It is not evident how argument practices actually incorporate any 
second-order discussion that will help them build and rebuild common ground to keep 
them moving towards the desired goal.  
For effective application of a new idea within dispute resolution, there needs to be 
a way to translate the theoretical underpinning of an argument practice into specific 
advice on which practice to choose in which contexts, or on how to modify existing 
practices for better results. As a theorist of dispute resolution practices, I want the 
promise of a new vision developed into options for application.  What would it look like 
in practice to apply a “second order” concept of common ground?  
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